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Background
Covert audio communication refers to the technique of embedding secret information 
into carrier audio such that important information can be transmitted safely and reli-
ably via public communication. This technology can also be used by terrorists to commit 
criminal activities, which pose a serious danger to society (Qiao et  al. 2013). Traffick-
ers and terrorists have begun to hide secret information in audio files, such as MP3 and 
WAV files, and spread them by file sharing or e-mail through high-quality Internet (Gel-
fand 2007).
The speech, as an important branch of the audio, is one of the most important meth-
ods for human communication and is ubiquitous and accessible. Currently, existing cov-
ert speech communication algorithms (Singh 2016; Tayel et al. 2016; Hartoko et al. 2015; 
Krishnan and Abdullah 2016; Nutzinger and Juergen 2011; Matsuoka 2006; Byeong-Seob 
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et al. 2005; Tatsuya and Kotaro 2015; Chen 2001) include the following: least significant 
bits (LSB) hiding (Tayel et al. 2016; Hartoko et al. 2015; Krishnan and Abdullah 2016), 
phase coding hiding (Nutzinger and Juergen 2011), direct sequence spread spectrum 
(DSSS) encoding hiding (Matsuoka 2006), echo hiding (Byeong-Seob et al. 2005; Tatsuya 
and Kotaro 2015), and blending-based speech hiding (Chen 2001), along with others. 
Among these algorithms, the blending-based speech hiding algorithm is different from 
others, where the secret speech can be hidden directly in the carrier speech and does not 
need to be binary encoded. This algorithm has a good robustness (Rangding et al. 2004) 
and high hidden capacity.
In contrast with covert speech communication, the aim of speech steganalysis (Natara-
jan and Nayak 2010; Ghasemzadeh et al. 2016; Bhattacharyya and Sanyal 2012; Chunhui 
and Yimin 2010; Wei et al. 2008; Hamza et al. 2003) is to detect the existence of secret 
information in covert speech communication and extract that information. Steganalysis 
algorithms can be divided into two classes based on their scope of application. One class 
is specific steganalysis algorithms (Chunhui and Yimin 2010; Wei et al. 2008), and the 
other is universal steganalysis algorithms (Hamza et al. 2003; Özer et al. 2006; Avcıbas 
2006). However, no experiment has determined whether existing steganalysis algorithms 
are applicable to blended speech.
For the above reasons, this paper proposes a steganalysis algorithm for blended speech 
transmitted via a high-quality Internet. The algorithm is based on the average zero cross-
ing rate (Muhammad 2015; Ali et al. 2011; Ghosal and Suchibrota 2014) of the odd–even 
difference (AZCR-OED) of the speech, and it combines a support vector machine (SVM) 
classifier (Mathias and Mohamed 2015; Alex and Bernhard 2004) and a voice activity 
detection (VAD) algorithm (Shota et al. 2016; Qi et al. 2002; Xinyan and Guojun 2013; 
Jongseo et al. 1999). The algorithm can detect the existence and estimate the embedding 
rate of blended speech. The experimental results demonstrate the high accuracy, effec-
tiveness and robustness of this algorithm for a variety of embedding rates.
This paper is organized as follows: “Blending-based speech hiding algorithm” section 
provides a brief introduction to the blending-based speech hiding algorithm. The fea-
tures, such as the AZCR-OED of the speech, are analyzed in “Feature analysis” section. 
A steganalysis algorithm for blended speech, which is used for existence detection and 
embedding rate estimation, is proposed in “Steganalysis algorithm for blending speech” 
section. Experimental results and analyses are given in “Experimental results and analy-
sis” section. Finally, “Conclusion” section presents the conclusions of the work.
Blending‑based speech hiding algorithm
P denotes the carrier speech of length N, and S denotes the secret speech of length M. 
The blending-based speech hiding algorithm is described as follows (Nutzinger and 
Juergen 2011):




F(2k − 1) = P(2k − 1)
F(2k) = (1− α)P(2k − 1)+ αS(k)
· (1 ≤ k ≤ M )
(2)First: F(k) = P(k), 1 ≤ k ≤ N
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where 1 ≤ k ≤ M, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, α is the hidden degree factor; start is the location of 
the start of the secret speech, where start ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,N − 2M}; and F denotes the 
blended speech of length N. F is more similar to the carrier speech P as α decreases. Fur-
thermore, Eq. (3) implies that M and N must satisfy N ≥ 2M.
In this paper, we define a stego speech segment as a speech segment in which secret 
speech is hidden in blended speech. From Eq.  (3), we know that the stego segment’s 
length is 2M. The embedding rate is defined as the ratio of the length of the stego speech 
segment to the entire length of the blended speech and is denoted by η. Thus,
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 100%, η = 0 means there is no stego speech segment in the speech sig-
nal, and η = 100% means the carrier speech is completely used to hide the secret speech. 
Generally, for a fixed length of secret speech, a lower embedding rate requires a longer 
carrier speech signal, which leads to lower communication efficiency.
Given Eq. (3), the extraction algorithm for secret speech can be defined as follows:
where 1 ≤ k ≤ M. From Eq.  (5), we can observe that if the receiver wants to extract 
the secret speech from the blended speech, he/she must know at least the following 
information:
1. the location of the start of the secret speech;
2. whether the odd–even points are aligned (which is defined below) with the sender;
3. the hidden degree factor α of the secret speech.
The aims of this paper are as follows: extract the features that can distinguish pure 
speech from blended speech to detect blended speech, judge whether the odd–even 
points are aligned with the sender and correct the inverted case, estimate the hidden 
starting location of the secret speech and the length of the stego speech segment, and 
calculate the embedding rate.
Feature analysis
In this section, we first briefly state several definitions that will be used later. Then, the 
difference in the odd–even difference (OED) between the blended speech and pure car-
rier speech is analyzed and compared. Finally, we present the features that can distin-
guish pure and blended speech.
(3)Then:
{
F(2k − 1+ start) = P(2k − 1+ start)







F(2k + start)− (1− α)P(2k − 1+ start)
α
=
F(2k + start)− (1− α)F(2k − 1+ start)
α
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Definitions
Definition 1 For the speech signal X(X = {x(1), x(2), x(3), . . . , x(N )}), the OED is 
defined to be the difference between the values of odd and even points. Denoting the 
OED by D, we have D(k) = x(2k)− x(2k − 1), where 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊N/2⌋ and ⌊·⌋ denotes the 
rounded-down value.
Definition 2 For a sent speech signal X(X = {x(1), x(2), x(3), . . . , x(N )}) and received 
speech signal R(R = {r(1), r(2), r(3), . . . , r(M)}), when r(n) = x(n) (where 1 ≤ n ≤ N  ), 
we consider the odd–even points of the received speech to be aligned with the sent 
speech. When r(2k − 1) = x(2k) and r(2k) = x(2k + 1), where 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊N/2⌋, we 
define the odd–even points of the received speech to be inverted with respect to the sent 
speech.
Definition 3 For the speech signal X(X = {x(1), x(2), x(3), . . . , x(N )}), the average 
zero crossing rate (ZCR) (Muhammad 2015; Ali et al. 2011; Ghosal and Suchibrota 2014) 
is defined as follows: 
 where sgn[x(k)] =
{
1, x(k) ≥ 0
−1, x(k) < 0
.
OED of the speech signal
X and R denote the pure sent speech signal and the received speech signal, respectively. 
Four cases of the OED of received speech are discussed below.
It is assumed that the hidden starting location of the secret speech is start = 0 and 
that the embedding rate is η = 100%. For other values, the derivation is similar.
Case 1: the received speech is the blended speech, and the odd–even points are aligned 
with the sent speech. The OED denoted by Drc is as follows:
Case 2: the received speech is the pure speech, and the odd–even points are aligned 
with the sent speech. The OED denoted by Dro is as follows:
Case 3: the received speech is the blended speech, and the odd–even points are 






∣∣sgn[x(k)] − sgn[x(k − 1)]∣∣,
(6)
Drc(k) = R(2k)− R(2k − 1)
= F(2k)− F(2k − 1)
= (1− α)P(2k − 1)+ αS(k)− P(2k − 1)
= α[S(k)− P(2k − 1)].
(7)Dro(k) = R(2k)− R(2k − 1) = X(2k)− X(2k − 1).
(8)
Dwc(k) = R(2k)− R(2k − 1)
= F(2k + 1)− F(2k)
= P(2k + 1)− (1− α)P(2k − 1)+ αS(k).
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Case 4: the received speech is the pure speech, and the odd–even points are inverted 
with respect to the sent speech. The OED denoted by Dwo is as follows:
We selected two pure speech samples from the Voice of America (VOA) Special Eng-
lish corpus (http://www.51voa.com/VOA_Special_English/) randomly and transformed 
them into the WAV format with an 8-kHz sampling rate and 16-bit speech encoding. 
Then, one of the samples was chosen to be the secret speech and hidden in the other 
using the blending-based speech hiding algorithm, with an embedding rate of 100 % and 
a hidden degree factor α = 0.05. Finally, both the pure and blended speech were trans-
mitted through QQ, a popular instant messaging software service in China that is used 
for chatting, and the receiver analyzed the OED of the received speech. The result is 
shown in Fig. 1 (to see the result clearly, only data points 1–200 are shown in the figure).
We can intuitively see from Fig. 1 that the change in the OED of the blended speech 
when the odd–even points are aligned with the sent speech, which is denoted by Drc, is 
less rapid than in the other three cases. In this paper, we use the average ZCR to describe 
this difference.
AZCR‑ODE of the speech signal
According to definition 3 and Eq.  (6), the corresponding AZCR-OED of Drc can be 
determined as follows:



















∣∣sgn[S(k)− P(2k − 1)] − sgn[S(k − 1)− P(2k − 3)]∣∣.
Fig. 1 OEDs of the pure speech and the blended speech: a Drc, b Dro, c Dwc, and d Dwo
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In Eq. (10), we can see that Z(Drc) is determined only by the value of the secret speech 
and the carrier speech and is unrelated to the hidden degree factor of the secret speech.
To verify whether the AZCR-OED can serve as feature to distinguish between blended 
and pure speech, we first obtained 8000 pure speech samples from the VOA Special 
English corpus (http://www.51voa.com/VOA_Special_English/.). Then, we transformed 
all of them into the WAV format with an 8-kHz sampling rate and 16-bit speech encod-
ing and built a speech sample library (which is hereafter referred to as the “VOASE” 
library). Finally, we divided the VOASE library into two groups, the secret speech group 
and the carrier speech group. We performed a statistical analysis of the AZCR-OED of 
the blended speech and pure speech through the following experiments.
Experiment 1: we calculated the OEDs Dro and Dwo for the pure speech in the VOASE 
library under both conditions, where the odd–even points are aligned and inverted, 
along with the corresponding average ZCR values, Z(Dro) and Z(Dwo). Figure 2 shows 
the statistical results.
Experiment 2: we made five copies of the carrier speech group. Then, secret speech 
was embedded into the carrier speech signal using the blending-based speech hiding 
algorithm with five different embedding rates. Because the embedding rate is typically 
high in practical applications, we selected 10, 30, 50, 70, and 100 % as the embedding 
rates in the experiment. When the odd–even points are aligned, the AZCR-OED of 
blended speech is unrelated to the hidden degree factor. Thus, we used a hidden degree 
factor of 0.1 in the experiment. Consequently, we obtained five blended speech groups 
with different embedding rates. We calculated the OED Drc of each blended speech sig-
nal and the corresponding average ZCR Z(Drc). Then, we inverted the odd–even points 
of each blended speech, and calculated the OED Dwc of each inverted blended speech 
signal as well as the corresponding average ZCR Z(Dwc). Figure 3 shows the statistical 
results.
Experiment 3: we made fifteen copies of the carrier speech group and then embedded 
secret speech into the carrier speech using the blending-based speech hiding algorithm 
with fifteen combinations of three hidden degree factors and five embedding rates. In 
Fig. 2 Statistical results for Z(Dro) and Z(Dwo), the AZCR-OED of pure speech when the odd–even points 
are aligned and inverted, respectively
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the experiment, the hidden degree factors were 0.1, 0.01, and 0.005, and the embed-
ding rates were 10, 30, 50, 70, and 100 %, respectively. Thus, we obtained fifteen blended 
speech groups. We inverted the odd–even points of the speech in the blended speech 
groups and calculated the OED Dwc of each inverted blended speech signal and the cor-
responding average ZCR Z(Dwc). Figure 4 shows the statistical results.
From Fig. 2, we can observe that whether the odd–even points are aligned has almost 
no effect on the AZCR-OED of the pure speech, i.e.,Z(Dro) ≈ Z(Dwo).
From Fig.  3, we can observe that Z(Drc) and Z(Dwc), which are the AZCR-OED of 
the blended speech when the odd–even points are aligned and inverted respectively, 
increase as the embedding rate decreases. Comparing Z(Drc) and Z(Dwc), we can see 
that the former is significantly less than the latter when the embedding rate is the same.
Fig. 3 Statistical results for Z(Drc) and Z(Dwc), the AZCR-OED of blended speech when the odd–even 
points are aligned and inverted, respectively
Fig. 4 Statistical results for Z(Dwc), the AZCR-OED of blended speech when the odd–even points are 
inverted
Page 8 of 15Li and Gao  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1049 
From Fig. 4, we can observe that the hidden degree factor of the secret speech has little 
effect on Z(Dwc) when the embedding rate is kept fixed.
Comparing Figs. 2 and 3, we can see that Z(Drc) is significantly less than Z(Dro) and 
Z(Dwo) when the embedding rates are different.
From the experimental results, we can conclude that it is feasible and effective to use 
the AZCR-OED of the speech as a feature to distinguish between blended and pure 
speech.
Steganalysis algorithm for blending speech
In this section, we use the differences of the AZCR-OED between blended speech and 
pure speech to build a steganalysis algorithm for blended speech. The algorithm can 
achieve the following under a variety of embedding rates.
1. It can detect the existence of secret speech.
2. For blended speech, it can determine the hidden location of the secret speech and 
estimate the embedding rate.
Existence detection of blended speech
Because the AZCR-OED of blended and that of pure speech have obvious differences, 
when the odd–even points of the blended speech are aligned, the AZCR-OED is lower 
than when they are inverted. In this paper, according to the features of the blended 
speech, we first correct the case in which the odd–even points are inverted and then 
extract the features and use a SVM classifier to detect the existence of blended speech. 
Table 1 summarizes the procedure for extracting the features from a speech signal.
Comparing Fig. 2 with Fig. 3, we see that the differences in the AZCR-OED between 
blended and pure speech are reduced when the embedding rate is low. It is thus easy to 
make a misjudgment using the SVM classifier. However, when the AZCR-OED of the 
stego speech segments is low, calculating the average ZCR per frame and extracting the 
minimum one as the feature can enhance the differences between blended speech and 
pure speech, and misjudgment can be reduced. For this reason, the second feature v2 is 
chosen.
In this paper, we use the above algorithm to extract the feature vector of the blended 
and pure speech and then use the freely available software package LIBSVM for training 
to establish a classifier, finally achieving existence detection of the blended speech.
Table 1 Algorithm for feature extraction
Input: A speech signal X of length N
Output: A feature vector F that contains two features
Step 1: For a given speech signal X, invert its odd–even points to obtain the inverted version Xw
Step 2: Calculate the OED of X, which is denoted by Dr, and the OED of Xw, which is denoted by Dw
Step 3: Calculate the average ZCRs of Dr and Dw, respectively, which are denoted by Z(Dr) and Z(Dw). Obtain the 
first feature v1, where v1 = min{Z(Dr), Z(Dw)}. Here, the reason we take the smaller average ZCR is to correct 
the case in which the odd–even points of the blended speech are inverted
Step 4: If Z(Dr) ≤ Z(Dw), set D = Dr; otherwise, D = Dw. Divide D into N frames and calculate the average ZCR 
per frame, choosing the smallest value as the second feature, which is denoted by v2
Step 5: Construct the feature vector F =< v1, v2, Type > from these two features. The type attribute specifies 
whether the signal is blended (1) or pure (−1) speech object
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Estimation of the embedding rate
For the blended speech, the AZCR-OED of the stego speech segments is less than that of 
the pure speech segments. Table 2 presents the algorithm to detect the hidden location 
of the secret speech and estimate the embedding rate.
We chose two speech samples randomly from the VOASE library. Then, we chose one 
to be the secret speech and hid it in the other using the blending-based speech hiding 
algorithm with an embedding rate of 50 % and a hidden degree factor α = 0.01. Then, 
the algorithm presented above was used to detect the hidden location of the secret 
speech. A frame length of 256 was used. The result is shown in Fig. 5.
From Fig. 5a, we can observe that the AZCR-OED values of most of the stego speech 
frames are less than the value for the entire blended speech signal, and the AZCR-OED 
values of most of the pure speech frames are greater than the value for the entire blended 
speech signal. Comparing panels (a) and (b) of Fig. 5, we see that the estimated hidden 
location of the secret speech is similar to its actual hidden location. These experimental 
results demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm.
Table 2 Algorithm for estimating the embedding rate
Input: A blended speech signal X of length N
Output: Hidden location of the secret speech and the estimated embedding rate
Step 1: For a given speech signal X, invert its odd–even points to obtain the inverted version Xw
Step 2: Calculate the OED of X, which is denoted by Dr, and the OED of Xw, which is denoted by Dw
Step 3: Calculate the average ZCRs of Dr and Dw, respectively, which are denoted by Z(Dr) and Z(Dw), and set 
Qmean = min(Z(Dr), Z(Dw))
Step 4: If Z(Dr) ≤ Z(Dw), set D = Dr; otherwise, D = Dw
Step 5: Divide D into N frames and calculate the average ZCR per frame, which is denoted by Q(i), where i denotes 
the ith frame
Step 6: Let Flag(i) denote the symbol of the ith frame: Flag(i) ∈ {0, 1}. If Q(i) < Qmean, set Flag(i) = 0; otherwise, 
Flag(i) = 1
Step 7: The hang-over scheme (Avcıbas 2006; Muhammad 2015), which is a type of VAD algorithm, is used for 
Flag(i) to mark the secret speech segments, thereby ensuring that the hidden location of the secret speech is 
determined
Step 8: Calculate the length of the secret speech segments and the embedding rate
Fig. 5 Hidden location of the secret speech: a Actual hidden location and b Estimated hidden location
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Experimental results and analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the algorithms for feature extraction and 
estimation of the embedding rate.
One thousand speech files were randomly selected from the VOASE library and 
divided into two groups. One group was the secret speech group, which contained 500 
secret speech files. Ten copies of the other 500 speech files were made to be used as 
carrier speech files, which were embedded with secret speech using the blending-based 
speech hiding algorithm with 10 different embedding rates of 10, 20, 30… 100 %. Because 
the AZCR-OED of blended speech is unrelated to the hidden degree factor of the secret 
speech, the hidden degree factor was chosen to be 0.01 in the experiments. Therefore, 
500 blended speech signals were obtained for each embedding rate.
Basic experiments
Existence detection of the blended speech
We randomly chose 250 blended speech files and 250 pure carrier speech files for each 
embedding rate and marked their type as 1 or −1, respectively. We then extracted the 
feature parameters for training the SVM classifier and used the remaining 500 speech 
samples, including 250 blended and 250 pure speech samples, for testing. Figure 6 shows 
the experimental results.
From Fig. 6, we can observe that the detection accuracy can be greater than 80 % when 
the embedding rate is greater than 10 %, and the accuracy of detection increases as the 
embedding rate increases.
From the results, we conclude that the reason that the detection accuracy decreases as 
the embedding rate decreases is as follows. The amount of secret speech decreases when 
the embedding rate decreases, thus, the differences in the AZCR-OED between blended 
and pure speech decrease. It is therefore easy for the SVM classifier to make a misjudg-
ment, thereby decreasing the detection accuracy. However, for a fixed length of secret 
speech, a lower embedding rate requires a longer carrier speech signal, which leads to 
Fig. 6 Detection accuracy for ten different embedding rates
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low communication efficiency. Thus, a low embedding rate is not adopted in practical 
applications of covert speech communication.
Embedding rate estimation
Under each actual embedding rate, we used 500 blended speech files to estimate the 
embedding rate using the algorithm described in “Estimation of the embedding rate” 
section and then calculated the mean and variance of the estimated embedding rate. The 
experimental results are presented in Table 3.
From Table 3, we can observe that the estimated embedding rate is similar to the real 
value, and the variance is small. The AZCR-OED of the blended speech increases as the 
embedding rate decreases, which increases the threshold that distinguishes the stego 
and pure speech frames. Therefore, many pure speech frames were misjudged to be 
stego speech frames, which caused the embedding rate to be overestimated.
Experiments for robustness
To testify the robustness of this algorithm, we designed a group of attack experiments on 
the test speech for each embedding rate, including: (1) Resample: the speech is sampled 
up to 16-kHz then sampled down to 8-kHz. (2) Requantization: 16-bit encoding speech 
is converted to 8-bit encoding. (3) Gaussian white noise: the white noise is added with 
the SNR being 25 dB. (4) G.729 compression encoding.
We extracted the feature parameters from the attacked training speeches, and sent 
them to trained SVM classifier respectively. Then we can detect the existence of secret 
speech. Figure 7 shows the experimental results (for a better comparison, we redraw the 
curve in Fig. 7).
From Fig. 7, we can observe that:
1. for the different embedding rate, the detection accuracy without attack is higher than 
that with attacks;
2. the attacks of resample and requantization have a lower effect on detection accuracy;
3. the attack of Gaussian white noise has a higher effect on detection accuracy;
Table 3 Embedding rate estimation
Actual embedding rate (%) Estimated embedding rate
Mean (%) Variance
10 12.54 2.80 × 10−2
20 21.48 2.50 × 10−2
30 30.13 1.98 × 10−2
40 40.53 1.79 × 10−2
50 51.31 1.79 × 10−2
60 60.23 9.2 × 10−3
70 69.63 8.1 × 10−3
80 81.53 5.3 × 10−3
90 90.43 6.7 × 10−3
100 98.43 1.64 × 10−2
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4. after the speech is encoded with the G.729 compression encoding, the performance 
of the detection is reduced substantially;
5. under different types of attacks, the detection accuracy increases as the embedding 
rate increases. Therefore, we can divide a long speech into short speech segments so 
that we can improve embedding rate in some speech segments of blended speech. 
Thus, the detection accuracy can be increased.
Similarly, under each actual embedding rate, we processed 500 blended speeches using 
the aforementioned attacks, and then estimated the embedding rate using the algorithm 
described in “Estimation of the embedding rate” section. The experimental results are 
presented in Table 4.
From Table 4, we can find that no matter what kind of attack it is, there is certain influ-
ence on estimated embedding rate. And the attacks lead to a bigger estimated error than 
the case of no attack. But the estimated embedding rate is around the actual embedding 
rate.
Fig. 7 Detection accuracy under different types of attacks













10 12.54 6.87 7.00 12.31 14.07
20 21.48 15.53 16.71 22.32 14.97
30 30.13 24.68 34.06 33.31 22.58
40 40.53 46.01 44.19 43.29 48.36
50 51.31 56.68 54.79 52.61 58.48
60 60.23 65.89 65.18 57.41 67.31
70 69.63 74.52 73.63 67.15 78.12
80 81.53 82.91 83.00 77.78 86.79
90 90.43 87.88 88.35 85.87 82.98
100 98.43 96.64 96.08 94.96 92.21
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In conclusion, for the steganalysis algorithm which is proposed in this paper, we can 
safely conclude that it has a good robustness for the attacks such as resample, requanti-
zation. But it is sensitive to Gaussian white noise and G.729 compression encoding.
From the Eq. (3), it can be seen that the algorithm hides the secret speech by modify-
ing the values of even points of carrier speech in the time domain. When Gaussian white 
noise is imposed on blended speech, the OEDs of the blended speech will be changed 
significantly due to the randomness of the noise. Especially when the positive or negative 
prescriptions of the OEDs which are close to zero are changed, it will have large impact 
on ZCRs of each frame and the entire speech. The probability of misjudgment and the 
estimated error of embedding rate will then be increased.
G.729 compression encoding divides the speech signal into frames in length of 10 ms. 
Each encoded signal frame is represented with 80 bits. For the WAV format speech with 
an 8-kHz sampling rate and 16-bit quantization, the data rate is 128kbps. With a com-
pression rate of 16:1, the data rate will be lowered to 8kbps after the G.729 compression 
encoding. Consequently, G.729 compression encoding will cause a large loss of numeri-
cal information in the time domain of the blended speech. It inevitably leads to that the 
AZCR-OED is not compliance with the original features any more. Therefore this case 
also can increase the probability of the misjudgment, as well as the estimated error of 
embedding rate.
Although the robustness of this steganalysis algorithm is not ideal when speech is 
attacked by Gaussian white noise or G.729 compression encoding. But in the practical 
application, the probability is low for the blended speech to be attacked by strong white 
noise or compression encoding. There are two main reasons. First, the Internet chan-
nel has a high-quality. Second, the hidden capacity of the blending-based speech hiding 
algorithm is high, which results that the blended speech has a low compressibility. In 
order to extract the secret speech correctly, for both sides of the covert communication, 
it is less likely to transmit the compression blended speech.
Conclusion
In this paper, we first briefly introduced the background and significance of this paper 
along with the blending-based speech hiding algorithm. Then, considering a high-quality 
Internet, we analyzed the differences in the OED values of blended and pure speech and 
quantified these differences using the average ZCR. The experimental results verified 
the correctness of the theoretical analysis. Finally, we proposed a steganalysis algorithm 
for blended speech. The algorithm successfully achieved existence detection of blended 
speech and embedding rate estimation under many embedding rates, and the experi-
mental results demonstrate the high accuracy, effectiveness and robustness of this algo-
rithm. Determining how to estimate the hidden degree factor α of secret speech and 
how to extract the secret speech signal are our future research goals.
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